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Introduction
The work of Emile Durkheim certainly occupies a noteworthy place in the literature of criminology. His theories of law, punishment and crime (at least homicide) are highly integrated and remarkably ambitious in their historical scope. Yet, despite Durkheim's prominence as a sociologist, and despite the numerous studies that have attempted to test his theories, much of his criminological perspective remains poorly understood and underdeveloped. This article represents a step toward cor recting this problem. It represents an effort to exhume, elaborate and hopefully draw some attention to Durkheim's theory of gender and homicide-a theory that has existed in a latent form for over a century and yet has received almost no atten tion from criminologists.
The objectives of this article are twofold. My first and primary objective is to identify the core concepts and propositions of Durkheim's theory of gender and homicide. Because he presented this theory in a fragmented, incomplete and somewhat ambigu ous manner, it is necessary to examine not only his explicit statements concerning the gender/homicide relationship, but also his general theory of homicide and his theory of gender role evolution. These latter theories are needed to fill conceptual gaps, clar ify vague statements and develop the evolutionary dimension of his theory. My second objective is to explicate the mix of conservative, liberal and potentially feminist conten tions that are evident in Durkheim's reasoning. An understanding of the somewhat mixed nature of his gender viewpoint is necessary to avoid an excessively critical response to the conservatism of his theory of gender and homicide.
To avoid confusion, it perhaps is necessary to note a few additional points the purpose of this article. To begin, I believe the subject matter and should be of historical interest to criminologists. They are important for an understanding of Durkheim's overall criminological perspective and early cr cal thought on gender and homicide. This, of course, does not mean that theory of gender and homicide is empirically sound; and I do not wish to su in its original form it can compete with contemporary accounts of this The issue of the empirical accuracy of his arguments is simply beyond the article. Moreover, in presenting Durkheim's arguments, I made no attem down his statements so that they are more consistent with contemporary a sibilities. On this matter, I am inclined to accept the same position as K (1995: lix) : 'I cannot be in the business of rehabilitating Durkheim's une attitudes about women. If sufficient to sink to him forever, they should be Yet, it also should be noted that my goal is not merely to critique and dism for being unenlightened. On the contrary, I conclude that a rudimentar century egalitarian current can be found among his patriarchal contentions
This article consists of four parts. In the first part, I outline Durkhei theory of homicide; in the second, I outline his theory of gender role evolu third part, I use these theories to elaborate his specific comments on the ge icide relationship and attempt to derive a Durkheimian theory of historical this relationship. In the final part, I note some of the conservative and libe tions of Durkheim's work, and I address the relationship between his persp the late-nineteenth-century French tradition of 'familial feminism'.
Durkheim's General Theory of Homicide
To exhume and elaborate Durkheim's largely implicit explanation of t homicide relationship, it first is necessary to have a clear understanding of theory of homicide. Unfortunately, several contradictory versions of his g have been presented in the literature of criminology (e.g. Krohn 1978; M Huang 1995) , and the seemingly more popular versions oversimplify and arguments.1 For this reason, I will begin by providing a brief overview of general theory of homicide and, in the process, will attempt to point out s common myths surrounding his theory. The following overview is consiste based largely on a recent and considerably more detailed examination of theory of homicide (see DiCristina 2004) . First, Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1951 [1900] 1957: 119) generally vi cide as an intentional act that is 'inseparable from passion'. Thus, his ge of homicide is primarily an explanation of 'unpremeditated murder', defines as 'simple intentional homicide without aggravating circumstan premeditation or prearrangement' (Durkheim [1897 (Durkheim [ ] 1951 . In othe factors than those determining homicide' (Durkheim [1897] 1951: 348 ingly, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 349) concluded, 'The evolution of the tr cide cannot therefore be best observed through the variations of pre murder; its general orientation is better brought out by the curve of unpr murder'. (Throughout the remainder of this paper, homicide is conceiv as unpremeditated murder.)
Secondly, contrary to many interpretations of Durkheim's work, his gen of homicide suggests an overall negative relationship between the lev development and actual homicide rates. According to Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1957 [1900] 1969), as societies develop, shared feelings of respect for r gion proper), government, family and other 'collective things' tend to their intensity; this reduces a major source of homicidal passions. At th shared feelings of respect for the lives, possessions, freedom and honour o (collective sentiments of the 'religion of humanity') tend to become st provides greater restraint over the homicidal passions that remain. Thu kheim's theory, actual homicide rates should be lower in 'organized soc trial or modern societies) than in 'segmentary societies' (pre-industrial or p societies), other things being equal.3
Thirdly, Durkheim arguably came to regard the decline of collective related to collective things as the primary reason for the negative relationsh ers perceived as existing between societal development and homicide. Initial ([1897] 1951: 356) , he suggested that the development of the religion of hum lective sentiments related to 'the individual') was the most important factor variations in homicide rates. However, in a lecture published in Professiona Civic Morals ([1900] 1957: 114-17) , he explicitly noted that variations in collective things are the more important determinant. With this shift in e kheim ([1900] 1957; [1900] 1969) maintained a high degree of consistency explanation of declining homicide rates and his explanation of the declining punishment. He explained both phenomena mainly in terms of weakening f collective things rather than the correlated strengthening of feelings for hu Fourthly, and again contrary to much of the criminological literature, Du not conclude that the level of societal development has the same effect on cide and property crime. The contention that, according to Durkheim, crime increase with modernization clearly is a distortion of his work. As ju concluded that homicide rates generally decline with societal developm other hand, he suggested that we should not be surprised by an increas crime rates. This is evident in a statement he made in The Division of Labo 'Because there are now more ways in which property may be acquired, wise more categories of theft' (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1984 . Presumab are more ways to acquire property, there are more opportunities for prope likewise, if there are more categories of theft, acts that formerly were not impossible may now be included in the theft rates. Either way, this seems we should not be surprised by a positive relationship between societal develo property crime rates.
Fifthly, while Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1951 [1900 ] 1957 suggested that both societal development and the rate of social change influence homicide implied that the level of societal development is the more important variab words, the decline of collective sentiments related to collective things and t the religion of humanity-two phenomena that generally accompany soc ment-are more important determinants of homicide than anomie-a p that generally accompanies abrupt social change.4 Nowhere in his work have suggestion that anomie is the most important cause of homicide. This di anomie may surprise some criminologists, but it is unlikely to surprise have carefully examined Durkheim's work. For instance, when commen importance of anomie within Durkheim's writings, Philippe Besnard (1 cludes that 'anomie is only a minor and fleeting theme in Durkheim's w addition, an insufficiently elaborated one '.5 Finally, Durkheim's discussions of societal development generally centred tions between organized society and various levels of segmentary society-s 'ancient' societies of Egypt and India, the city-states of Athens and Rom industrial Christian societies. Accordingly, when applying his theory to exp cide variations in a 'single society' at different points in time (and contrary his own research on this matter), the time frame ideally should extend to s ries, not just a few decades.
Durkheim's Theory of Gender Role Evolution
The exhumation and elaboration of Durkheim's theory of gender and h require an understanding of his theory of gender role evolution. Altho ments on this subject are brief and somewhat inconsistent, it nonetheless is piece them together and arrive at a noteworthy historical perspective. In th this perspective is outlined. The reader will note that his theory of gender tion embodies propositions that offend contemporary cultural sensibilit gender equality. This matter is addressed later in this article. My first c present his theories accurately; only after this is completed is it reasona them and to address judgments of them.
To begin, in The Division of Labor, Durkheim ([1893 Durkheim ([ ] 1984 con the 'sexual division of labor' increased with social evolution. In describing th he began by noting that the physical differences between women and men societies developed. He commented that since 'prehistoric' times, the s women has declined relative to the strength of men and, citing a study by Bon, 6 suggested that the brain size of women has declined relative to that o in this same work, Durkheim commented that women received fewer bene 'civilising process' and are less civilized than men. In his words: 'She certain characteristics to be found in primitive natures ' (p. 192).7 For Durkheim ([1893] 1984: 17-22) , the growing physical differenc women and men correspond to growing functional differences. He held th segmentary societies, women and men often fulfilled similar functions an the same kind of existence'; a kind of 'primeval homogeneity' existed amo support of this conclusion, he provided examples of societies in whic actively involved in political life and wars. However, with social developm division of labour became more elaborate, with the roles of women and m more specialized:
Nowadays, among civilised peoples the woman leads an existence entirely different fro be said that the two great functions of psychological life had become as if dissociated f one sex having taken over the affective, the other the intellectual function (Durkheim As conceived by Durkheim ([1893 Durkheim ([ ] 1984 , the affective functions sist of family duties and, increasingly, aesthetic pursuits (e.g. art a whereas the intellectual functions appear to consist of economic, polit ific activities. Durkheim implied that this sexual division of labour is a po ment, since the complementary differences it entails are a source of orga In Suicide, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 384-6) provided a few additional c gender role evolution. In his discussion of how we should reduce suici 'matrimonial anomy' ('conjugal anomy'), he again emphasized that w are different, and that they 'do not share equally in social life' (p. 385). C his earlier work, he maintained that women have 'remained to a far great product of nature' (i.e. the product of their 'organism'), while men ar highly socialized', being 'almost entirely the product of society'. Likewise, that the differences between women and men increased with social evolut some differences might continue to increase as organized societies deve more, he implied that women might come to dominate the 'aesthetic func whereas men may become more exclusively 'absorbed by functions of util However, in this work, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 384-6) also stated tha come to play a 'more active and important' role in organized societies. The between women and men may continue to increase, but the unique ch women 'will become of greater social use than in the past' (p. 385). For ins ring to gender role differences between urban and rural areas, he states t differs from man much more in cities than in the country; and yet her moral constitution is most impregnated with social life in cities' (pp. 385-Durkheim anticipated that women and men will become 'socially equali ferent ways' as organized societies develop. Likewise, he expected m opportunity, although he added that due to differences in 'aptitudes', wom would continue to serve different functions.
In The Division of Labor and Suicide, Durkheim presented a relatively of gender role evolution. However, it has been noted that he appear this theory in other works, where he describes a significant degree of ation and inequality in 'primitive' societies (see Gane 1993; Shope 19 in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim ([1912 Durkheim ([ ] 1995 repeatedly acknowledged the separation of w children and 'uninitiated men', from sacred objects, places and practic itive' societies of interest to Durkheim, women were commonly regar fane than men and, thus, inferior to men:
The religious dignity that... is inherent in each member of the clan is not equal to a higher degree than women, who are like profane beings in comparison to m Later in this same work, Durkheim described the status of women even ... a women serves more often than a man as the passive object of the most cruel m she has lower social significance, she is more readily singled out to fill the function Hence, in his later work, Durkheim saw 'primitive' societies as embody degree of gender stratification. At first glance, this appears to repres ment of his earlier theory of gender role evolution, in which he empha and men of these societies often serve similar functions and lead 'rough of existence'. Yet, a fundamental shift in his perspective may be more real, for it still may be argued that Durkheim retained his earlier theor First, in his initial discussions of gender role evolution, he did not con differentiation is entirely absent in 'primitive' societies. Secondly, the significant degree of gender stratification in 'primitive' societies does possibility that the sexual division of labour increased with social evol ([1912] 1995: 137-8, 261, 384) implied that gender differentiation in th not complete; more specifically, he acknowledged that women of thes excluded from all sacred ceremonies and are not regarded as entirely p he still could argue that gender differentiation increased with social e Lastly (and perhaps most importandy), Durkheim, in his 1898 essay origin of the incest taboo ([1898] 1963),11 acknowledged a significant d stratification in 'primitive' societies. This is important, for this essay w after the first edition of Suicide (which appeared in 1897) and several second edition of The Division of Labor (which appeared in 1902). Cons prompted to ask: Is it reasonable to conclude that Durkheim's view of tion changed fundamentally over the short period of time that separat of Suicide from his essay on incest? And is it reasonable to conclude th saw no point in altering the original presentation of his theory in the The Division of Labor? My point here is not to arrive at a definitive c ply to indicate how it can be argued that Durkheim retained his initia perhaps in a somewhat modified form. In any case, because the is 10 Although, as Janet Hinson Shope (1994) points out, Durkheim, at least in his later work, may have women were observed participating in religious ceremonies by suggesting that the ceremonies were not 11 In his 'Note on the Translation', Edward Sagarin (1963: 175) states that this essay first appeared in 1 the first volume of L'Année Sociologique. However, 1898 typically is given as the publication date, because volume of L Année Sociologique.
unsettled, it seems at least as reasonable to assume theoretical consiste theoretical change.
Accordingly, given this situation and, more importantly, given the fact outlined his account of the gender/homicide relationship in Suicide, discussion will give priority to his initial descriptions of gender role evol
Durkheim's Theory of Gender and Homicide
Durkheim's comments on the relationship between gender and homicide w incomplete. Yet, when combined with his more general theory of homicid ments on gender role evolution, it is possible to derive an account of gen in homicide rates and why these differences may change across the various s development. I will begin by outlining and elaborating Durkheim's com gender/homicide relationship independent of societal development; I will to the implied effects of societal development on the gender-ratio for hom Gender/homicide relationship Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 341-2) accepted that women generally comm cides than men, but he also argued that the difference is not as great as m believe, since women commit more homicides than the official statistics indicate. He claimed that homicide figures are more likely to be underestimated for women than for men, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the kinds of homicide often committed by women tend to be more difficult to discover than the homicides more commonly committed by men. Durkheim suggested that poisonings, infanticides and abortions are committed more frequently by women, but these lethal acts also happen to be easier to conceal than other forms of homicide.12 On the other hand, he pro posed a variation of the 'chivalry thesis'. He asserted that women generally receive more lenient treatment from the criminal justice system and, thus, are more likely than men to receive the benefit of any doubt in a homicide case. The overall result, from Durkheim's perspective, is that homicide figures for women are underestimated to a greater degree than homicide figures for men. Despite this perceived error of official statistics, Durkheim ([1897] 1951) still viewed women as committing fewer homicides than men and offered a partial explanation of this phenomenon. The following passage outlines the general propositions of his theory:
To be exact, this influence of sex is an effect rather of social than of organic causes. Woman kills her self less, and she kills others less, not because of physiological differences from man but because she does not participate in collective life in the same way. . . . Whenever homicide is within her range she commits it as often or more often than man. ... So there is no reason to suppose that she has greater respect for another's life because of her congenital constitution; she merely lacks as frequent opportu nities, being less deeply involved in the struggle of life. The causes impelling to sanguinary crimes affect her less than man because she is less within their sphere of influence (pp. 341-2).13 12 Durkheim ( [1897] 1951: 342) referred to such acts as 'characteristically feminine forms of murder'.
13 Several years later, Durkheim ([1906] 1980) extended this line of reasoning beyond homicide to crime rates in general.
Explaining the relatively low female crime rate in Germany, he states, '... the causes are social, and women ... by not participating as direcdy as men in the collective life, submit less to its influence and experience less of its various consequences ' (p. 409). This passage contains two important points that require emphasis and c First, Durkheim, remaining true to the sociological perspective he embraced the biological contention that lower homicide rates for women are du innate respect for human life and, instead, accepted the sociological con women commit fewer homicides because they 'do not participate in colle the same way'. According to Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1951 , 'Man is actively it, while woman does little more than look on from a distance'. Women are involved in the struggle of life'. This does not mean that biology is entirely i noted earlier, Durkheim accepted an association between physical attribu development of the sexual division of labour. What needs emphasis her rejected the idea that women instinctively have more respect for human lif this innate respect explains their lower homicide rates.
Secondly, Durkheim concluded that because women are less actively inv lective life, they experience less exposure to the 'causes' of homicide. Here, sary to speculate (a little) on which causes he is referring to, since he did n them in any detail at this point in his work. In view of the passage above and theory of homicide, it appears the causes centre on gender differences in so tural locations and socialization. The issue of differential social locations concerns the distribution of homicide opportunities. The issue of differential socialization conc the way in which homicidal dispositions are shaped by three variables: collective s ments related to collective things, the religion of humanity, and anomie. I begin the issue of gender differences in social locations.
Differential social locations (homicide opportunities) Durkheim ([1897] 1951) clearly accepted the idea that homicide rates for wom men are influenced by the 'opportunities' they have to take the lives of other peo Specifically, due to their distinct social location, women do not have as many hom opportunities as men. Durkheim's emphasis on this variable is difficult to miss: 'W ever homicide is within her range she commits it as often or more often than m she merely lacks as frequent opportunities . . . ' (p. 342) . Nonetheless, I believe it w be a mistake to overemphasize the significance of this statement and reduce his t of the gender/homicide relationship to a simplistic opportunity theory. My conte is that this statement represents an exaggeration, and this seems confirmed by an statement that closely follows it: 'The causes impelling to sanguinary crimes affec less than man because she is less within their sphere of influence' (p. 342). The ence to 'causes' implies that gender differences in homicide rates are shaped by m than one factor (more than just differential opportunities) ; and given that Durkh identifies more than one causal factor in his general theory of homicide, I believe most reasonable to take his reference to 'causes' literally.
There is another issue here worth mentioning. Given that Durkheim's theo homicide is commonly viewed as distinct from (and in competition with) 'opportu theory' (see LaFree and Kick 1986; Neuman and Berger 1988; Bennett 1991) , important for criminologists to note his explicit emphasis on the distribution of cide opportunities in this instance. Indeed, this emphasis is consistent with his ge theory of crime. As noted earlier, it is consistent with Durkheim's ([1893] 198 ment on the expansion of criminal laws prohibiting theft-a comment that se support an opportunity theory of property crime. It also is consistent with his arg concerning the normality of crime, particularly his proposal of a partiall tionship between criminal behaviour and social progress. Durkheim [1895] 1983) suggested that both criminal behaviour and social progr opportunities to think and act in unique ways (ways that clash with senti common consciousness) ; accordingly, the reduction of such opportunities society would reduce not only criminal behaviour, but also progress morality.
Differential socialization (homicidal dispositions)
Moving on to the issue of differential socialization, it seems safe to assume important cause of gender differences in homicide rates, from a Durkhei tive, is the differential internalization of collective sentiments related to co arguably the most significant determinant of homicide within Durkheim's of homicide (see Durkheim [1900 Durkheim [ ] 1957 DiCristina 2004) . Given his ass men are 'much more highly socialized' than women (Durkheim [1897] reasoning implies that men will come to adopt these sentiments more tho women. Men will tend to have more intense feelings of respect for their c family and other things of a collective nature. And, since Durkheim views s primary source of homicidal passions, his reasoning ultimately implies that to commit more homicides than women. Men are more likely to be enrag against their religion, country or kin; because of their intense respect for things, they are more likely to view such offences as sacrileges. In this sen theory of homicide suggests that effective socialization-specifically, the e nication of 'traditional' sentiments, feelings that underpin mechanical sol major cause of homicide, especially in segmentary societies.
Yet, Durkheim also suggested that socialization entails counter-forces th icidal tendencies by furthering the adoption of the religion of humanity societies and by constraining anomic currents (i.e. by constraining hum Such forces, of course, do not help explain why men commit more h women. Regarding the adoption of the religion of humanity, if men tend highly socialized as Durkheim argued, they should develop more inten respect for the lives, possessions, freedom and honour of individuals. Thi to provide them with greater restraint over their homicidal passions and, a may even prompt the conclusion that men should have homicide rates as than women. However, Durkheim maintained that the internalization of t humanity does not necessarily offset the effects caused by the adoptio sentiments related to collective things. Where sentiments related to co are strong, they overwhelm feelings of respect for humanity (Durkheim Thus, a positive relationship between socialization and homicide remain Unfortunately, the complexity of this relationship increases when view from Durkheim's perspective. He repeatedly noted that the general c common consciousness varies across different stages of societal develo cally, he argued that sentiments related to collective things gradually giv 14Durkheim ([1901b] 1980) provided another example of how socialization can limit criminality. In a rev Friedrich Prinzing, he concluded that the dissolution of marriage tends to increase 'crime' and 'misdeme more than among men, because 'woman's nature is less strongly socialized than man's' (p. 414). However, in to be referring primarily to 'crimes against property' rather than homicide. religion of humanity as societies evolve from segmentary to organized ation obviously complicates Durkheim's conception of both the s cide relationship and the gender/homicide relationship. To make m latter relationship is further complicated by Durkheim's suggestion th women increases as organized societies develop. I will return to th present, it need only be emphasized that Durkheim's perspective impli out much of human history, a shared respect for collective thing 'stifle' the religion of humanity; and given that men have been more than women, the sense of humanity among men has been silenced to a causing them to experience greater homicidal passions.
While perhaps of secondary significance only, the variable of anomi attention. Earlier, it was noted that a careful reading of Durkheim' This being said, the conclusion that anomie is of secondary signi imply that it cannot be integrated into Durkheim's theory of gen Initially, one may be inclined to conclude that his anomie theory, by tive relationship between socialization and homicide, predicts more homicides by women because they are (from his viewpoint) less socialized than men. Being less socialized, their desires would be less regulated and more difficult to satisfy, causing them to experience greater 'exasperation and irritated weariness'. In other words, one may jump to the conclusion that Durkheim's anomie theory contradicts his theory of gender and homicide, as it has been described to this point. Yet, such a conclusion would be hasty, for it is possible to argue that men experience the effects of anomie more intensely than women.16 In his discussion of anomie suicide, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 272-3) concluded that matrimonial anomie has more adverse consequences for men than women and, in fact, some degree of matrimonial anomie 'can only better the wife's situation'.17 In this connection, he suggested that the desires of women, at least their sexual desires, are naturally (instinctively) more limited than those o totality of women's desires are more 'naturally limited', women would be ble to currents of anomie, to times and locations where desires lack societ Women could experience more anomie than men but suffer lower levels of and anger. In short, anomie simply may generate homicidal passions readily than in women.
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that Mike Gane (1993: identified another line of reasoning in Durkheim's work that may be exte explain gender differences in homicide rates. It represents a partial explan of violence by 'superiors' against 'inferiors'-for instance, by develo against developing societies, by elders against the young, and perhaps by m women. Durkheim ([1902 Durkheim ([ -03] 1973 ) suggested that when one group reg superior to another, it tends to develop sentiments that prompt violen 'inferior' group, at least when other factors do not intervene to prevent t his words, 'whenever two populations, two groups of people having une come into continuous contact with one another, certain feelings develo the more cultivated group-or that which deems itself such-to do vi other ' (pp. 192-3) . 18 Durkheim noted that such violence frequently i involves grave dangers' for the 'superior' group; nevertheless, it seems ine it is constrained by a strong moral force (e.g. 'familial feelings' or 'public any case, where women are regarded as inferior to men, this 'law' implies be inclined to commit acts of violence against women, and such acts (if increase the homicide rates of men relative to those of women.19 Durkheim did not present this line of reasoning as part of his general theory of homicide, nor in his com ments on the gender/homicide relationship, yet it appears to be a rational extension of his work in this area.
Overall, from a Durkheimian viewpoint, men generally have higher homicide rate than women because their social structural location provides them with more homicide opportunities and because their more intense socialization has planted within them strong feelings of respect for collective things-seeds of strong homicidal passions Anomie and a sense of male superiority also may help to explain this gender diffe ence, although these factors appear to be of secondary significance given Durkheim discussions of homicide. Conversely, Durkheim's perspective does not imply that women should be more involved in homicide because they are less socialized and thu have more freedom from the common consciousness. Certainly, he held that we nee some freedom from the common consciousness to commit criminal acts, but he also suggested that many factors shape criminal behaviour patterns. These factors not only include those mentioned above (i.e. criminal opportunities, strong sentiments related to collective things, the religion of humanity, anomie, and a sense of group superiority), but also the forced division of labour and the age structure of society. The tendency among many criminologists to reduce Durkheim's theories of crime to a few variables (e.g. anomie and the factors that influence it) seriously distorts his perspective.
Societal development and the gender-ratio for homicide
Durkheim's theory of the gender/homicide relationship can be elabora integrating his comments on the relationship between societal dev participation of women in collective life (i.e. his theory of gender Through such integration, his perspective suggests two provisiona cerning historical trends in the gender-ratio for homicide. One pertai societies; the other concerns organized societies.
The first hypothesis is the following: As societies developed from si forms (hunting and gathering societies) to the initial organized forms societies), homicide rates for women should have declined relative to homicide rates for men. Durkheim implied that the participation of women in collective life decreased over this period of societal development. Accordingly, if he is correct, women were gradually placed in social locations that left them with fewer opportunities to commit homicides and with less violent dispositions. Durkheim implied that over this period, women experienced less socialization relative to men; and from his viewpoint, socializa tion, especially in segmentary societies, is a driving force behind homicide. Of course, socialization may work against homicide where it advances feelings of devotion to humanity and constrains anomie. But, as noted earlier, for Durkheim ([1900] 1957), socialization also promotes feelings of respect for collective things (e.g. church, nation and family), and these feelings, after reaching a certain level of intensity, are perhaps the primary source of homicidal passions.
This first hypothesis and the theory from which it is derived are complicated by Durkheim's argument that as societies develop, there is a decrease in feelings of respect for collective things and an increase in feelings of devotion to humanity. This means that as women were becoming less involved in collective life and, therefore, developing less violent dispositions, men also were developing less violent dispositions. Unfortunately, I have found nothing in Durkheim's work that directly addresses the implications of this situation. However, as an extension of Durkheim's perspective, it seems reasonable to conclude not only that women experienced fewer homicide opportunities relative to those of men as segmentary societies developed, but also that women experienced a more marked decline in homicidal passions compared to the decline experienced by men. The end result is a decrease in homicide rates for women relative to homicide rates for men as societies developed toward an organized form.
Yet, it still must be admitted that Durkheim's theory of gender and homicide is ambig uous on this matter-a problem that could prompt a significantly different interpretation.
The second hypothesis is this: As organized societies develop, homicide rates for women should increase relative to homicide rates for men. Durkheim implied that dur ing this phase of societal development, women generally become more involved in collective life. Even though the nature of their involvement is expected to remain distinct from men's, their increasing participation in social life suggests that they will acquire more opportunities to commit homicides and will develop more violent dispo sitions (due to their greater socialization), at least relative to the opportunities and dis positions of men. If homicidal dispositions, in general, tend to decline with societal development (as Durkheim argued), those experienced by men should decrease with the advance of organized societies, while those experienced by women may increase, remain the same or decrease at a slower rate, depending on the nature of their increas ing socialization. In any case, women should develop more violent dispositio to those of men.20
What's more, given Durkheim's viewpoint, there are two other reasons to increase in official homicide rates for women relative to those for men societies develop. On the one hand, women should increasingly find t social locations where their homicides are more visible and their apprehens probable. On the other, if they experience greater social equality, the crim system should increasingly treat women and men the same, making it l women to be acquitted in cases where men would be convicted.
Overall, these two hypotheses imply curvilinear historical development o ratio for homicide-the gender difference being relatively small in the societies, then increasing until the birth of organized societies, and s decreasing as organized societies evolve. Conservative, Liberal and Feminist"? In view of contemporary academic sensibilities concerning gender equ scholars may be inclined to dismiss Durkheim's theory of gender and being overly conservative and patriarchal. This is understandable, and would be best to purge his theory of its more patriarchal elements before it as a competitor against contemporary accounts of the gender/homicide However, to be fair to Durkheim and to avoid misunderstandings of his cr perspective, it is important to acknowledge the liberal and potentially ments of his writings. At the risk of digressing too much, this section pro what detailed examination of this matter. It begins with a summary of the and liberal contentions that can be found in Durkheim's comments on g followed by a brief discussion of the relationship between his viewpoin nineteenth-century French tradition of 'familial feminism'.
Conservative and liberal contentions
The political orientation of Durkheim's general social theory is not easily summarized, especially in view of the secondary literature. Durkheim has been referred to as a 'con servative ' (e.g. Nisbet 1952; Coser 1960 ), but he also has been labelled 'a typical repre sentative' of 'the liberal and radical humanitarianism of the nineteenth century' (Sorokin [1937] 1962: 613; also see Seidman 1983) .21 His 'approach to social order' has even been described as 'unambiguously radical' (Taylor et al. 1973: 87) . Upon examining Durkheim's major works, most social theorists who are devoted to a particu lar political orientation probably would find something in them to condemn, as well as something to commend. As Jennifer Lehmann (1995: 927) suggests, it seems reason able to characterize his 'political position as a complex synthesis of conservatism alism, and radicalism'. Nonetheless, my objective here is not to sort throu various conceptions of Durkheim's political orientation; rather, it simply is to h some of the conservative and seemingly liberal elements of his arguments conc gender.
Because both conservatism and liberalism have multiple meanings, they first must be defined.22 In the text that follows, conservatism refers to a political orientation that emphasizes respect for tradition, resists social change and ignores the distribution of opportunities across individuals and social groups; on the other hand, liberalism refers to an orientation that emphasizes 'human reason' over tradition, favours 'rational' social change (at least gradual change), and promotes greater equality of opportunity. In view of these definitions, Durkheim's perspective on gender arguably contains ele ments of both orientations, at least if it is examined in the context of late-nineteenth century French culture. I will begin by summarizing his conservative conclusions and then proceed to his more liberal contentions. Durkheim's conservatism Regarding the conservative elements of Durkheim's viewpoint on gender, many of his statements indicate an acceptance of traditional patriarchal thought and resistance to social change that embraces gender equality. As noted earlier, not only did Durkheim conclude that modern women are physically weaker than modern men, he also con cluded that women are intellectually inferior. He seemingly accepted Le Bon's conclu sion that the brain size of women has declined relative to that of men over the course of social evolution (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1984 . This is especially noteworthy since Le Bon was a recognized antifeminist (see Offen 1984: 661-2) . Moreover, on several occasions, Durkheim asserted that women are more 'primitive' and 'instinctive' than men; con versely, he portrayed men as 'more highly socialized' and having a more developed 'mental life' (Durkheim [1893 (Durkheim [ ] 1984 [1897 ] 1951 [1901b] 1980: 414; [1904] 1980:131) .
Also recall that, for Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1951 , the desires of 'men' are not limited by 'human nature', while the desires of women, at least their sexual desires, are 'naturally limited'. Could 'human nature' affect men and women differently? Or is female nature distinct from 'human nature', while male nature is synonymous with it? If the desires of women are naturally limited, Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1951 , in at least one sense, categorizes them with animals, for he describes animals as having naturally limited desires. Upon examining these statements, it is not especially shocking to hear one of his critics conclude that 'to Durkheim women are uncivilized primitives at best, and nonhuman animals at worst' (Lehmann 1994: 36) . Of course, to say that Durkheim excluded women entirely from his conception of humanity-that is to say that he viewed women as 'nonhuman animals'-seems hasty and extreme. Yet, there is a sense in which he regarded women as less 'human' than men on average, and many of his comments can be used to rationalize patriarchal social arrangements.
On the role of women in organized society, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 38 'To be sure, we have no reason to suppose that woman may ever be able same functions in society as man . . . He maintained that women and m tinue to serve different social functions because they have different ' noted earlier, Durkheim ([1893 Durkheim ([ ] 1984 suggested that women mig the affective functions of society (e.g. family duties, art and literature), w might come to focus more exclusively on the intellectual functions (e.g. bu ics and science). Despite being framed as a positive social phenomenon organic solidarity), this division of labour appears to suggest an unequal dis wealth and power across the sexes; after all, it implies that men will co nomy and government.
In addition, Durkheim ([1902 Durkheim ([ -03] 1973 , in one of his lectures education, implied that affective aptitudes and functions, as a whole, migh to intellectual aptitudes and functions. Specifically, he claimed that the tea ence is more important than the teaching of art and literature. By associat with the affective sphere of social life and then suggesting that this spher ary importance, Durkheim appears to envision and support social arrangem organized societies that concentrate women in less respectable social p other words, not only may women's social positions provide them with less power than men's positions, but they may provide them with less prestige the next section, this issue is examined from an alternative viewpoint.) Overall, such contentions-which arguably extend to the heart of Durkhe theory-embody traditional patriarchal thinking, imply resistance to socia would increase gender equality, and help rationalize an inequitable distribut tunities across the sexes. Yet, these statements do not provide a complete p kheim's perspective on gender. They represent only his more extreme and comments and, hence, it would be hasty to dismiss his perspective on this bas Durkheim's liberalism Regarding the more liberal elements of Durkheim's viewpoint on gender, some of his statements direcdy challenge traditional patriarchal thought and encourage funda mental social change in the direction of greater gender equality, including greater equality of opportunity. Most of these statements can be found in Suicide. There, he suggested that men generally benefit more from marriage than women,24 and that weaker matrimonial regulation 'can only better the wife's situation' (Durkheim [1897] 1951: 268-76, 384-6). According to Durkheim ([1897 Durkheim ([ ] 1951 , 'the interests of hus band and wife in marriage are . . . opposed . . . the latter requires above all, liberty, and the former, discipline . . . '. In this connection, Durkheim ([1897] 1951: 385-6) antici pated and supported the development of social arrangements where women and men are 'socially equalized, but in different ways', for such arrangements would 'reduce the unhappy moral conflict actually dividing the sexes'. Moreover, he a equality of opportunity between women and men (Durkheim [ that women are becoming more active in society; they are serving mo tions; and, ultimately, they may be 'socially equalized' in relation while he often seemed to suggest that the affective dimension of social the intellectual dimension, he occasionally implied that a great div between them and that an affective role in society, in at least one sens freedom it offers), may be preferable to an intellectual role.
Obviously, this does not establish Durkheim as a liberal on gende can understand Lehmann's (1994: 149) conclusion that 'he takes a libera position with respect to men and a conservative (caste) perspectiv women'. Most of Durkheim's comments on the relationship betwee ment and gender roles do appear conservative from a contemporar point. However, his comments do not fit completely into the conservati this is the point I wish to emphasize. Not only is his general social theo liberal than conservative,26 his fragmented comments on gender role include a few liberal contentions. Indeed, two works that are com Durkheim's critics to illustrate the conservative nature of his pers used to support a more moderate conclusion. The two works are 'D Consent' ([1906] 1978) and his review of Marianne Weber's book, Eh in derRechtsentwickelung ([1906-09] 1978 ).
In the former work, Durkheim ([1906 Durkheim ([ ] 1978 argued that efforts to divorce by mutual consent, if successful, would likely have a negat 'normal functioning' of marriage 'without... resulting in an increase o diminution of unhappiness for the average spouses' (p. 250). His pos 25 Durkheim ([1895 25 Durkheim ([ ] 1982 had more than this to say: 'Between science and art there is no longe from one to the other without any break in continuity. It is true that science can only concern itself with ation of art, but art is only the extension of science.'
26 The liberal nature of his theory is perhaps most evident in his consistent opposition to inherited w of labor (Durkheim, [1892 (Durkheim, [ ] 1965 (Durkheim, [ , [1893 (Durkheim, [ ] 1984 (Durkheim, [ , [1897 (Durkheim, [ ] 1951 (Durkheim, [ , [1902 (Durkheim, [ ] 1984 ; but it also is evident in his theory the religion of humanity. D [CRISTINA is noteworthy because he abandoned an important conclusion arrived at in namely that the situation of wives generally improves as matrimonial re weaken. In 'Divorce by Mutual Consent', he would go no further than to st 'Divorce does not appear unfavorable to married women' (p. 245). He even s that some 'mediocre marriages make life more bearable and gentler for the and that divorce by mutual consent would contribute to their dissolution (p this way, Durkheim distanced himself from his earlier argument-an argum could be used to support more liberal divorce laws.
However, a liberal current still can be found in this essay. First, Durkheim con maintain that the institution of marriage served the interests of men more than women. Secondly, Durkheim explicitly noted that he supported divorce: 'Most a nothing is further from our intent than to place in question the principle of d would seem indisputable that in certain conditions spouses must be allowed to esc their marriage' (Durkheim [1906 (Durkheim [ ] 1978 . Thirdly, he opposed efforts to divorce in a way that would jeopardize the welfare of children; indeed, he seem strongly opposed to divorce by mutual consent ' where there are children (p. 251, Durk emphasis). Durkheim acknowledged that divorce sometimes is in the best interest couple's children, but he added that parents are not always the best judges of thi In short, given that children have long been one of the most subjugated segment ety, Durkheim's reasoning in this instance should be understood and perhaps emb a liberal consciousness. Lastly, he reaffirmed his acceptance of a liberal intellectu In his words, 'There is no institution, even among those which pass for being t sacred, which I consider to be above question' (Durkheim [1906 (Durkheim [ ] 1978 .
A mix of conservative and liberal reasoning also can be found in Durkheim's ( 1978) review of Weber's book, Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwickelung. review, he referred to Weber as 'a wisely conservative mind' and then pre even more 'conservative' line of reasoning. Durkheim agreed with Weber's c that the social position of women in the family has determined their social pos society, but he concluded that her history of the family was too 'simplistic' an her reasoning did not adequately support her call for less restrictive divorce law complete equality between husband and wife. In his discussion of neo-patria ily life during the early twentieth century, Durkheim suggested that the primar women was to 'preside over this interior life' and that this role had 'taken on g importance' (p. 143). He then went on to argue that the respect shown to w ing this time period stemmed primarily from their family role, and that such could decline if the institutions of marriage and family were to weaken. T expansion of women's rights and the development of a greater public role for w while improving their situation in one sense, would be accompanied by a sig loss. In view of this line of reasoning, it is very understandable how Durkheim could use this review to classify him as a conservative on gender issues.
However, his critics commonly fail to note two important points about this r First, Durkheim ([1906 Durkheim ([ -09] 1978 ) stated that his purpose was to indicate ho and perhaps other researchers do not grasp the full complexity of the issue.27 27 Durkheim ( [1906-9] 1978: 143) noted, ' we believe that Weber's simplistic argument and the conclusions whi from it fail to recognize the complexity of the problem.' He then proceeded to conclude: ' ... the gain which they (wom owe to the conquest of the rights which are claimed on their behalf would be compensated by important losses. Th show that the problem is less simple than one would think, and that is all that we wished to establish ' (p. 144). suggested, his goal was more academic than directly political, although argument certainly could be used to reinforce a conservative agen more importantly), he stated 'We are far from arguing that the legal st it is determined by the civil law of European peoples does not ca reforms ' (p. 143) . In other words, despite his conservative line of appeared to favour some significant changes in the law designed to im status of women'. Although he was not prepared to go as far as We acceptance of 'important reforms' implies the possible acceptance o eral agenda concerning the interests of women, at least when viewed f point of early-twentieth-century Europe.
While there clearly are reasons to be critical of Durkheim's perspectiv some scholars have been very critical (e.g. Lehmann 1994; but also s Tiryakian 1995), the seemingly liberal elements of his perspectiv
Although he opposed the abrupt establishment of complete gender equ to have supported gradual change in the direction of greater gender e 1994). And despite the offensiveness of his perspective to contemporary ities, he arguably made some effort to embrace 'human reason' over tr on gender relations, to support 'rational' social change over long-term p ditional gender roles, and to accept greater equality of opportunity acro
Durkheim and familial feminism
To say that one can find a liberal current flowing through Durk conservative discussions of gender hardly implies that he was a femin sidered within his historical context, this conclusion is not as absur appear. On this matter, the work of Karen Offen (1984) warrants examination of the relationship between depopulation, nationalism late-nineteenth-century France, she suggests that Durkheim accepted was largely consistent with 'familial feminism'. Offen (1984: 654) notes that in late-nineteenth-century France, feminism were 'philosophically the most important'-namely 'fami 'individualist feminism' ('integral feminism'). Familial feminism w logically differentiated, family-centred vision of male-female complem ported a 'positive concept of women's special nature', a 'sexual div both society and the family' and the notion of 'equality in difference' committed to changing society to help women, its purpose was 'not to economic basis of patriarchy'.28 On the other hand, individualist f gender distinctions and the sexual division of labour. It espoused ' tunity', 'an end to sexism' and the right of women to be economic from men.
According to Offen, during the 1890s, most supporters of women's rights in France, and seemingly Durkheim as well (see pp. 664-7), adopted a variation of familial femi nism. In fact, most supporters of women's rights in the United States and Europe may have embraced a variation of this form of feminism: 'Despite significant differences in strategy and tactics, the feminist movements of most Western nations du twentieth century were reformist; they expressed family-centred, nonind ues similar to those embraced by the French feminists of the Third R (Offen 1984: 674) . Interestingly, Offen also suggests that many French fem considering the level of male political dominance, may have intentionally e their acceptance of 'womanly function and womanly style' as part of a acquire greater political and civil rights for women:
From an individualistic perspective, arguments for women's rights based on their ess as mothers are likely to be interpreted as counter-revolutionary. But within the histori of the patriarchal nation-state, when women's much touted moral influence was scan for their lack of economic and political power, such arguments may have provided th effective means of advancing their cause (p. 676).
Everything considered, Durkheim's writings do not fit neatly into an a mould when examined in their historical context.29 This point needs t bered if one wishes to have a sound understanding of his account of the ge cide relationship and, more generally, his overall criminological perspective
Conclusion
This article makes no claims concerning the empirical accuracy of Durkheim's latent theory of gender and homicide. Its general purpose was to exhume, elaborate and hopefully draw some attention to this theory-a theory that has been largely overlooked by criminologists for over a century. Durkheim's account of the relation ship between societal development, gender roles and homicide is fragmented, incom plete and occasionally ambiguous; moreover, in its present form, it is empirically questionable and entails a disconcerting amount of late-nineteenth-century patriarchal thought. Nonetheless, for anyone interested in the historical development of criminol ogy, Durkheim's comments on this subject are significant. Not only do they provide additional insight into early criminological thought on gender and crime, but they also extend and help clarify his overall criminological perspective-a perspective that occu pies a central place in the development of criminology and yet is repeatedly misrepre sented by the literature of the field. This being said, I wish to emphasize several conclusions that suggest reconsideration and reworking of the popular descriptions of Durkheimian criminological theory. First, although his discussions of law, punishment and crime usually neglected gender issues, Durkheim did not overlook them entirely; he implied that gender is of some import ance as a criminological concept. In this connection, he suggested that gender differ ences in both social structural location and socialization are factors that should be examined when explaining gender differences in homicide rates. Secondly, Durkheim recognized the relevance of variations in homicide opportunities and included this var iable in his theory of gender and homicide. This implies that his overall theory of crime is not entirely separable from opportunity theories of crime; there is more overlap between these two perspectives than the literature of criminology generally acknowledges.
Thirdly, he suggested that effective socialization-the internalization cultural sensibilities-can be a major cause of homicidal passions, espec core of the common consciousness is dominated by sentiments rel things. Indeed, one gets the impression that the adoption of strong co of respect for church, nation, family and other things of a collective to increase homicide than reduce it. Fourthly, Durkheim's comments r that his general theory of homicide is much more than an anomie the of anomie is just one part of his theory, and it seems to be of seconda Beyond this, it is perhaps worth mentioning that Durkheim accept superiority can be a cause of violence against people who are percei rior; he embraced the idea of curvilinear social development, at leas of social life; and he demonstrated some willingness to incorporate bio into his more macro-oriented approach to sociology.
